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Abstract—The SYN flood attack is a common attack strategy
on the Internet, which tries to overload services with requests
leading to a Denial-of-Service (DoS). Highly asymmetric costs
for connection setup—putting the main burden on the attackee—
make SYN flooding an efficient and popular DoS attack strategy.
Abusing the widely used TCP as an attack vector complicates the
detection of malicious traffic and its prevention utilizing naive
connection blocking strategies.
Modern programmable data plane devices are capable of
handling traffic in the 10 Gbit/s range without overloading.
We discuss how we can harness their performance to defend
entire networks against SYN flood attacks. Therefore, we analyze
different defense strategies, SYN authentication and SYN cookie,
and discuss implementation difficulties when ported to different
target data planes: software, network processors, and FPGAs.
We provide prototype implementations and performance figures
for all three platforms. Further, we fully disclose the artifacts
leading to the experiments described in this work.
I. INTRODUCTION
A TCP connection setup requires a three-way handshake
initiated by the client. First, the client sends a SYN segment,
selecting a random sequence number and setting its TCP
options. The server has to respond accordingly while storing
the client’s sequence number along additional connection-
specific metadata in a backlog containing Transmission Con-
trol Block (TCB) entries. This server-side state allocation has
to be done for each SYN segment received, which is the
weakness exploited by the SYN flood attack. By sending SYN
segments with different (spoofed) source addresses and ports
to the server, the capacity of the backlog is exhausted [17].
If all entries of the backlog are allocated, newly arriving
SYN segments will either be dropped, or old entries will be
reused [50]. Consequentially, SYN segments of a legitimate
client will either be dropped, or state might be evicted before
the client responds with the final segment of the handshake.
Thus, attacks lead to a DoS, as no new connections can be
opened.
In April of 2013 Israeli cyberspace was attacked, whereby
SYN flooding was a primary attack vector with up to 82 kpps,
exhausting both firewall and web server resources [41]. How-
ever, it was not the only attack vector, a UDP flood, saturating
the network’s bandwidth, as well as DNS and ICMP floods
were utilized. Furthermore, a RST flood was launched to
additionally cripple web server services. Similar behavior was
observed during an attack in September of 2013 targeting
large banking groups [42]. A SYN flood was part of a larger
UDP and HTTP flood, while specialized tools exploited web
server vulnerabilities. According to Kaspersky Lab’s quarterly
reports [33], from 2017 to 2019 the share of SYN flood traffic
during large-scale DDoS attacks rose up to 84 % becoming the
“most popular type of attack” [33] traffic.
Common mitigation strategies—SYN cookie and
SYN authentication—require the client to behave correctly
beyond the initial SYN segment. The strength of the defense
capabilities relies on the performance available to enforce and
check correct TCP behavior before initiating a costly TCP
connection. In this work we want to investigate how powerful
off-the-shelf data planes such as the software-based DPDK,
or programmable hardware such as Network Processing Units
(NPU) or FPGAs can be used for SYN flood defense.
We want to answer, (i) why endhosts cannot effectively
defend themselves against SYN flood attacks, (ii) what differ-
ent available defense strategies and their impact on TCP are,
and finally (iii) how we can leverage the power of modern
programmable data planes to provide flexible, scalable and
extendable solutions to mitigate SYN flood attacks.
The paper is outlined as follows. Section II summarizes
the state of the art for SYN flood defense and highlights
how SYN flood defense is currently implemented in Linux.
Based on this, we introduce our concept for a scalable SYN
proxy solution in Section III. Sections IV and V present our
prototype implementations using two different approaches: the
libmoon/DPDK software packet processing framework and
using the P4 domain specific language (DSL). We compare
our prototype implementations in regard to performance and
resource consumption metrics in Section VI. Related work is
presented in Section VII. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. STATE OF THE ART
Since the first mention of SYN flood attacks, manifold pro-
posals how to mitigate them have surfaced and implemented in
network stacks. In general, the mitigation methods can either
be applied on the end-host or handled externally.
A. Mitigation at Node Level
As the attack targets the TCP/IP stack of the server, pa-
rameter optimizations of the stack can be utilized on the
target server itself. Tweaking parameters or architecture of the
application results in only minimal, if at all, any success in
throttling the attack as these adjustments only affect the overall
performance of the TCP/IP stack and application [48, 6].
SYN flood-specific parameter adjustments of the
TCP/IP stack include increasing the backlog or reducing
the SYN/ACK retransmission times, thereby reducing the
timeout per TCB. Considering today’s bandwidths, modifying
these parameters only marginally delays the problem by
using more memory resources. In fact, the backlog structure
might not be designed to surpass a certain size, as data
structures or search algorithms used might become inefficient.
Thus, such modifications may worsen performance without an
attack [16]. Similar, reducing timeouts might lead to legitimate
connections, with a large RTT, not being fast enough to finish
the handshake before the entry gets deleted [16].
Replacing TCB entries either randomly or by choosing
the oldest entry is another approach to modify the backlog.
While this works for SYN flood rates of up to approx. 500
SYN segments per second [44], for packet rates possible in
today’s networks legitimate connections are evicted with high
probability (> 99%) before they get established.
Instead of storing the full TCB, only absolutely required
data, which can be as few as 16 B [27], can be stored in
the SYN cache approach. Secret bits of the SYN segment,
in combination with the addresses and ports, are hashed,
to determine the bucket in a hash map [16, 27, 17, 36].
In FreeBSD the size of such an entry is reduced to 160 B,
compared to 736 B for a TCB [17] in Linux, and can contain
more than 15 000 entries. Furthermore, the linked-list of each
bucket has a limited size, i.e., if a bucket would overflow, the
oldest entry gets deleted [35]. The idea is that the attacker does
not know how the hash is calculated, hence, can’t attack the
hash structure. Appropriate hash function choice ensures that
memory and computational resources required are limited [16].
A downside is that TCP options have restricted or no support.
The attack will eventually be successful when surpassing a
high enough SYN flood rate to exhaust the data structure.
A widely deployed method are SYN cookies [9]. State,
usually kept by the server, is instead encoded and put into
the sequence number nsyn, which can be freely chosen. A
legitimate client will finish the handshake sending a TCP ACK
segment, setting the acknowledgment number to nsyn + 1. The
server only accepts the connection and creates necessary state,
if the received number can be decoded and verified.
While using SYN cookies, the 32 bit sequence number is
made up of three different values. Five bits store a timestamp
value, that has an accuracy of 64 s, to prevent the collec-
tion and re-injection of old cookies [9]. Three bit encode
the Maximum Segment Size option as it is essential for
TCP performance. The remaining 24 bit are used to store
a cryptographic hash of the connection 4-tuple (source and
destination IP addresses and ports; as the attack is exclusive
to TCP the IP protocol field is not hashed) and the timestamp
value. Connection state is only created if the timestamp is not
outdated and the hash is correct.
SYN cookies perform a tradeoff: instead of consuming
memory resources (connection depletion attack), CPU re-
sources are exhausted [28]. Even an attack with low bandwidth
can shut down a high-performance server, exploiting the
asymmetric nature of the attack [30]. The server not only
has to calculate the cookie, but also verify it in the received
ACK segment. In theory, this makes the SYN cookie approach
susceptible to ACK floods. However, the computational effort
is the same as during a SYN flood calculating the cookie.
Similar to the SYN cache, a drawback of this approach is
the restricted support of TCP options. An updated SYN cookie
layout uses the TCP timestamp field [17] to also encode other
options that are widely used today [40].
The goal of SYN authentication is to not have the server
invest resources to verify the clients legitimacy. Instead, the
server expects a certain response to a triggered, unusual event,
which can be compared to client puzzles [8, 28, 52]. If the
client reacts accordingly, any further connection attempt is
whitelisted. Multiple approaches for challenges exist. The sim-
plest idea is to ignore or reset the initial connection attempt,
however, an attacker can simply resend the SYN segment
and is whitelisted. More advanced, the server sends, e.g., a
SYN/ACK segment with invalid sequence number. Clients
are expected to respond with a RST segment [27] (referred
to as Authwrong). Even so, an attacker can circumvent this,
by including a flood of RST segments in their attack. Other
SYN authentication approaches only whitelist once the client
has demonstrated its intent to finish a complete handshake
(final TCP ACK segment is received, referred to as Authfull)
or even by means of a higher layer protocol (e.g. a HTTP
GET request is received). Fingerprinting techniques can be
used to increase the probability that SYN and ACK/RST
segments for a handshake were sent by the same client (spoof
protection). For instance, the IPv4 TTL [39] (referred to as
AuthTTL) or TCP options signature can be compared. All
SYN authentication approaches can be further enhanced by
including a cookie value as sequence number, which can then
be verified on reception of the RST [44] or the ACK (referred
to as Authcookie). Similar to SYN cookies, the hash calculation
can be exploited by an attacker.
During the initial connection attempt no TCB state is
created. Instead, only when the client reacts accordingly, it
gets whitelisted, which can be accomplished by storing one
bit per flow, source address or source subnet. In particular,
no information about TCP options (or only a signature when
fingerprinting) is stored. Successive connection attempts do
not have to be modified or inspected beyond the SYN flag,
until the whitelist entry is invalidated.
A drawback is the interruption of the regular protocol flow
through a reset, increasing the delay for the initial connection.
Furthermore, if the attacker manages to get whitelisted, a
subsequent SYN flood is considered legitimate traffic.
All of the mentioned mitigation strategies can be combined
to form hybrid approaches. Aside from tweaking parameters
for optimization, more advanced strategies like the SYN cache,
SYN cookies or SYN authentication are usually only activated
on demand when an attack is detected [17].
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Fig. 1: Performance of Linux during SYN flood
B. Case Study: SYN Cookies in Linux
Linux’s TCP/IP network stack has SYN cookies enabled
by default, but only uses them when the backlog of a socket
is already full [3]. Linux follows the proposed SYN cookie
layout, encoding the MSS and a timestamp value with 60 s
resolution. If the client sent a timestamp option it is used to
encode further TCP options. As a case study, we analyze two
different Linux versions when subjected to a SYN flood, while
serving a static website (see Figure 6a): 4.9.0 and 4.19.0, using
SHA1 and SipHash as hash function, respectively.
Figure 1 shows the amount of processed SYN flood as well
as the probability to successfully serve 100 HTTP requests
per second for an increasing SYN flood. When disabling
SYN cookies, Linux can only process up to 250 SYN packets
per second. However, no HTTP requests are served. Profiling
(see Figure 2a) reveals that this behavior is not due to CPU
exhaustion. Instead, the backlog size is the limiting factor.
When enabling SYN cookies both Linux versions behave
similar, i.e., process up to 0.4 Mpps of SYN flood. Moreover,
up to this point, all HTTP requests are served. When further
increasing the SYN flood, the probability of serving any
legitimate requests successfully approaches zero. For Linux
4.19 it is notable that a small percentage (< 10%) of requests
is served, even for rates of up to 1 Mpps SYN flood.
Profiling (Figure 2b and Figure 2c) shows that, in this set-
ting, CPU utilization is the limiting factor. A clear difference
between the Linux versions is the amount of CPU cycles used
for hash calculation. Cookie calculation using SHA1 requires
up to 15 % of the cycle budget, while SipHash (2.5 %) is more
efficient. Given the cheaper hash function, one would expect an
increased performance for Linux 4.19 instead of the measured
decrease. We attribute this development to other networking
related changes between these Linux versions, which are
out of scope of this study. Profiling also reveals common
performance limiting factors of the Linux network stack. The
majority of CPU cycles are spent handling packet buffer and
memory (skb/mem), driver related processing (ixgbe/dev), IP
layer processing (ip/inet), and the TCP stack itself (tcp). The
numbers are in the expected range and comparable to other
Linux studies [43].
Primary goal of the network stack is to support as many
protocols as possible, providing a reliable, stable and robust
interface for userspace applications. Thus, raw performance is
secondary, wherefore Linux should not be used for mitigation
of large-scale SYN floods. Therefore, optimized solutions are
required. One approach to increase performance is to perform
filtering operations like DoS mitigation before the network
stack, e.g. by using the eBPF-programmable XDP [47].
Mere parameter changes to the TCP stack cannot effectively
defend against a SYN flood. Out of the more promising tech-
niques, SYN authentication and SYN cookie, Linux supports
the latter. However, our measurements show that Linux, in the
best case scenario, can cope with a maximum attack rate of
0.4 Mpps. Moreover, this strategy protects only applications
running on this node, i.e., in a cluster of nodes, each node has
to perform its own SYN flood mitigation, wasting CPU cycles
that could otherwise be used for running applications.
C. Mitigation at Network Level
SYN flooding is most successful when utilizing spoofed
source addresses. Therefore, applying ingress filtering [20]
would reduce effectiveness of this and other DoS attacks rely-
ing on spoofed addresses. Due to the distributed characteristic
of the Internet, this, however, is unlikely to happen [36].
Active or passive traffic monitoring of the total traffic in
the network can be used to detect anomalies, specifically to
detect higher than usual volumes of SYN segments, at the
network’s edge [17]. Machine learning or other means (e.g.
CUSUM [12, 13]) can be used to discern abnormal traffic
patterns. As result, the attack can be thwarted or throttled
before the traffic reaches the targeted server.
SYN flood mitigation strategies can be deployed either as
part of the TCP/IP stack on the server itself, or as separate
host, acting as SYN proxy. Advantages of using a dedicated
proxy include that the server’s resources are not utilized for
mitigation, as well as, that more than one server can be
protected. The concept of a SYN proxy is based on the idea
of intercepting potentially harmful traffic before it reaches the
server. Instead of the server, the proxy will answer to the initial
SYN segment [17, 36, 16] using for instance SYN cookies
or SYN authentication and only forward legitimate packets
to the server. Proxy services are often times combined with
monitoring of the traffic, i.e., only when an attack is detected,
traffic gets re-routed through the proxy.
A second approach for a SYN proxy is to allow all SYN
segments to reach the server as usual. However, for every
SYN/ACK that the server sends, the proxy will immediately
reply with a spoofed TCP ACK, which finalizes the connec-
tion, at least from the point of view of the server, and frees
backlog space occupied by the TCB [17]. If the client is
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Fig. 2: Profiling of Linux during SYN flood
legitimate and sends an ACK segment, the server will simply
ignore it as it was already received before. To cope with
malicious SYNs, the proxy will send a RST to the server
after a certain timeout to terminate the tentatively created
connection. The advantage of this strategy is that the proxy
does not “actively participate in legitimate connections after
they are established” [17]. However, the server is still subject
to the SYN flood and also has to handle a large amount of
established TCP connections.
D. Comparison
In Table I we compare the promising approaches based on
metrics also discussed in literature [44]. The weakness of the
SYN cache is the memory exhaustion, while SYN cookies
shift to utilizing CPU resources. SYN authentication strategies
do neither require extensive memory nor CPU ressources. The
exception are AuthTTL to store TTL values, and Authcookie
to perform cryptographic hashes. Calculating cookie values
is also the limiting factor for the efficiency, i.e., how much
SYN flood can be processed. None of the SYN authentication
strategies is transparent for the client application, as they reset
the initial connection. It has to be noted, that for instance
for modern browser implementations an automatic retry is
performed in this case, resulting in no significant interruption
for the user. A downside of SYN cookies is the limited support
for TCP options. Robustness specifies whether the signaling
capabilities of TCP are compromised [44]. This is the case
for all strategies besides the SYN cache, as no initial state is
kept, wherefore a retransmission of a SYN/ACK segment is
not possible. This is more severe for SYN cookies than for
SYN authentication, as the latter work on the assumption that
the client retries failed connection attempts anyway.
Lastly, we evaluate the techniques by whether they correctly
classify legitimate traffic. Assuming all packets are received
correctly and within the timeframe of the calculated cookie, no
technique produces false negatives (legitimate traffic classified
as malicious traffic). Only the SYN cache, SYN cookies and
Authcookie cannot be circumvented by malicious traffic, i.e.,
only a legitimate connection is passed to the server. No other
SYN authentication strategy fulfills this requirement, as a RST
or ACK flood can achieve whitelisting for malicious SYN
segments as no cryptographic cookie is used.
SYN Authentication
Cache Cookie Wrong Full TTL Cookie
Mem. immunity – + + + - +
CPU immunity + - + + + -
Efficiency - + ++ ++ ++ +
Transparency + + - - - -
Option support + -/o + + + +
Robustness + - o o o o
Classified as legitimate traffic
False Positive + + - - o +
False Negative + + + + + +
TABLE I: Comparison of SYN flood mitigation strategies
It has to be noted that these techniques are usually only
deployed during an ongoing attack. Therefore, the assumption
is that the server is under severe load caused by a SYN
flood, while only a small percentage of the traffic is legitimate
TCP traffic. The goal is to provide a best-effort approach of
service quality for legitimate flows, i.e., higher delay or minor
connection disruptions are acceptable, as long as any traffic is
served by the webserver.
None of the listed methods reliably shuts down the attack,
instead the success of the attack is delayed by having to
use more resources for the attack. Furthermore, no strategy
is part of the official TCP specification or standardized by
a committee [17]. The different strategies offer a tradeoff
between efficiency (performance) and correct classification
(false positives). For the remainder of the paper we focus
on SYN cookies and SYN authentication performing a full
handshake and using a cookie, as only these strategies offer
good protection. For the latter, we also discuss not using the
cookie to highlight the impact of performing the cryptographic
hash.
III. SYN PROXY CONCEPT
We identified a SYN proxy (see Figure 3) being the most
efficient and effective way of protecting a multitude of servers
without using their resources. We discuss the requirements
for implementing a flexible and open-source SYN proxy
and highlight challenges encountered when using different
mitigation strategies in this setup.
Proxy
Mitigation &
L2 Forwarding
Adversary
Adversary
Client
Adversary
Client
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Server
Server
Malicious traffic
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Fig. 3: SYN proxy scenario
A. Requirements
We have identified the following requirements for a high-
performance SYN proxy solution:
SYN Flood Mitigation: No malicious SYN flood traffic
should reach the protected server(s). A proxy implementation
should filter and drop malicious traffic while detecting and
forwarding legitimate connection attempts.
Performance: The proxy should be able to operate at line
rate of 10 GbE, i.e., it should be able to process 14.88 Mpps of
SYN flood. Furthermore, it should be scalable to even higher
data rates (e.g. 100 GbE).
Service Quality: Services provided by proxied servers
should be reachable for as many legitimate clients as possible.
As connections might occur during a DoS attack period, a best
effort approach regarding service quality for legitimate traffic
is chosen.
Furthermore, the behavior of the proxy should adhere to
standards, whenever possible, to guarantee the best possible
interaction with different client and server implementations.
Portability: To ease adoption, the proxy implementation
should focus on platform independence, facilitating deploy-
ments on a wide range of different hardware. Additionally,
fine-grained configurability should be possible, preventing
setup dependencies, whenever possible.
Extensibility: The proxy should serve as starting point
that allows for further SYN flood mitigation strategies, and
mitigation of other types DoS attacks, e.g. UDP or DNS floods.
While the proxy should perform well without any malicious
traffic, the concept of a SYN flood proxy, or in general an at-
tack mitigating proxy, includes, that it is only deployed during
an attack. Therefore, the proxy is designed with the assumption
that more than 90 % of all received traffic is malicious, i.e.,
only a minority of traffic is considered legitimate.
B. Mitigation Strategies
Based on the overview of mitigation strategies presented
in Section II we choose SYN cookies and different SYN
authentication variants for our prototype implementations.
1) SYN Cookies: SYN cookies are the first choice for
SYN flood mitigation as they are transparent to client and
server, i.e., no protocol violations or connection resets, but
only offer limited support for important TCP options.
However, when used in a proxy setup, SYN cookies raise
several issues. Once client and proxy have finished the initial
handshake (see Figure 4), the proxy cannot simply forward
segments of the client to the server, as the server is still
c:Client p:Proxy s:Server
SYN
seq = x, ack = -
y = calculateCookie(c, s)
SYN/ACK
seq = y, ack = x + 1
ACK
seq = x + 1, ack = y + 1
HTTP GET
seq = x + 1, ack = y + 1 E
r = translateSeqNum(c, s)
r == false
verifyCookie(y, c, s)
SYN
seq = x, ack = -
SYN/ACK
seq = z, ack = x + 1
ACK
seq = x + 1, ack = z + 1
δ(c, s) = z - y + 1
HTTP GET
seq = a, ack = b
translateSeqNum(c, s)
HTTP GET
seq = a, ack = b + δ(c, s) send
c bytes
HTTP 200 OK
seq = b + c - δ(c, s), ack = a + 1
translateSeqNum(c, s)
HTTP 200 OK
seq = b + c, ack = a + 1
Fig. 4: Message exchange for the SYN cookie strategy
unaware of the connection and has no state for it. To uphold
transparency of SYN cookies, the proxy has to start a second
connection between itself and the server. While the proxy
can reuse the first handshake’s sequence number in its SYN
segment (seq = x), the server will choose its sequence number
at random (z), i.e., it does not match the proxy’s sequence
number of the connection with the client (y). Consequently, the
proxy has to calculate and store the difference between these
sequence numbers. Later on, the proxy has to modify sequence
and acknowledgment numbers of every future segment of the
connection accordingly.
The second issue is that the first segment of data by the
client is sent directly after the third message of the first hand-
shake (see Figure 4). This poses a problem for the SYN proxy,
as the second handshake with the server is not completed yet.
Hence, the proxy cannot yet translate and forward the data
segment. As a consequence, the client retransmits this segment
after a timeout, for which 200 ms is a common time period.
Considering that modern RTTs are only a hundredth of this,
waiting for the retransmission is a significant delay penalty
and undesirable for the client.
A solution to combat this problem is for the proxy to store
the initial data segment instead of dropping it. Once the second
handshake is completed, the stored segment can be translated
and forwarded. Alternatively, the proxy can actively notify the
client once the second handshake is complete, by resending the
SYN/ACK segment, triggering a retransmission of the data
segment. Further improvements include setting a window size
of zero (zero window) in the original SYN/ACK segment,
indicating that the server cannot process any more data. Until
the SYN/ACK is resent with a non-zero window size, the client
c:Client p:Proxy s:Server
SYN
seq = x, ack = -
r = isWhitelisted(c, s)
r == false
calculateCookie(c, s)
SYN/ACK
seq = y, ack = x + 1
ACK
seq = x + 1, ack = y + 1
r = isWhitelisted(c, s)
r == false
verifyCookie(c, s)
setWhitelisted(c, s)
RST
seq = y + 1, ack = -
SYN
seq = x, ack = - r = isWhitelisted(c, s)
r == true
SYN
seq = x, ack = -
SYN/ACK
seq = y, ack = x + 1SYN/ACK
seq = y, ack = x + 1
ACK
seq = x + 1, ack = y + 1
r = isWhitelisted(c, s)
r == true
ACK
seq = x + 1, ack = y + 1
HTTP GET
seq = a, ack = y + 1 = b
r = isWhitelisted(c, s)
r == true
HTTP GET
seq = a, ack = b send
c bytes
Fig. 5: Message exchange for the Authcookie strategy
will not send the initial data segment, reducing bandwidth
wasted for a segment that will be dropped.
2) SYN Authentication: SYN authentication is the most
efficient solution due to its simplicity. As depicted in Figure 5,
the first connection attempt is interrupted. By whitelisting all
further attempts for this client, the proxy does not have to keep
a separate connection with the server or perform sequence
number translation. No connection state has to be stored by
the proxy, unless using AuthTTL, wherefore a simple bitmap
representing the whitelist is sufficient.
However, as ACK segments of established connections can-
not be distinguished from the third segment of the handshake,
the proxy has to check every segment against the whitelist. If
the origin is not whitelisted, the segment is assumed to be the
third segment of the handshake and, when using Authcookie,
the cookie hash is verified.
We focus on Authfull and Authcookie to analyze the perfor-
mance impact of calculating cookie values.
3) Comparison: Both strategies implemented as proxy have
differences in regards to packets modified, transparency and
option support (see Table II). For SYN authentication state
size depends on the whitelisting granularity, e.g. per flow or
for full subnets. However, state is reduced to one or two bit
per entry compared to keeping the sequence number difference
per flow for SYN cookies.
IV. SOFTWARE PACKET PROCESSING PROTOTYPE
We use libmoon [23, 18] to implement our SYN proxy pro-
totype in software targeting commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
hardware. libmoon offers a powerful and easy-to-use script-
ing layer on top of DPDK’s [2] raw packet handling (see
SYN Cookies SYN Authentication
Packet modification every segment handshake
Transparent yes no
Option support limited (encoded) full
State
State per flow flow/subnet
Lookup key 4-tuple 4-tuple/src. IP
Memory required > 32 bit 2 bit
Lookup for not SYN every segment
TABLE II: Comparison of SYN cookie and SYN authentica-
tion in proxy setup
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Fig. 6: Architecture of SYN flood mitigation mechanism
when used in Linux or as SYN proxy using software packet
processing or P4.
Figure 6b). As libmoon offers utility for header and packet
operations for a wide variety of protocols, crafting new and
individual packets is possible while retaining the performance
of DPDK [23]. The proxy is running as userspace program,
bypassing the regular kernel network stack. libmoon does
not offer a TCP stack therefore the handling of the TCP
handshake has to be done by the proxy application itself.
Utility functions for packet templating are available to simplify
the implementation of the TCP handshake. libmoon receives
and processes packets as batches. For each packet of a batch,
depending on the mitigation strategy and TCP flags set, a
response is crafted and sent after all packets of the batch have
been processed.
A. Hash Function
We use the pseudo-cryptographic SipHash [7] function to
calculate hash values for cookies and hashmap keys. It is
optimized for performance when using short inputs and is
used in many applications, including DoS protection [7]. It
has been shown that SipHash can be integrated efficiently with
programmable software and hardware data planes [46].
B. Connection State Tracking
A crucial part of state maintenance is correct tracking of
TCP connection state, i.e., adding new connections and to
regularly remove dead connections. Removing state of finished
connections serves two purposes: freeing memory space and
allowing the same 4-tuple to initiate a new connection. Ap-
proaches to state removal are either active, or passive. State
tracking aims at actively reacting to FIN and RST segments
of the connection to determine when the connection concludes.
For each flow, state kept by the proxy has to reflect whether
such a segment has been seen. If state tracking concludes that
the connection has been terminated, i.e., both sides sent and
acknowledged a FIN segment or a RST has been sent, the
corresponding state entry can be removed immediately. This
approach is difficult to implement as reordering of segments,
packet loss, retransmissions or connection timeouts, may result
in state being deleted too early, or not at all. A passive
approach is to use garbage collection, i.e., applying a second-
chance page replacement algorithm [14]. For this, each state
entry is extended with two bits, which are set every time the
entry is looked up. A periodic background process iterates
all entries and unsets one of the bits. If both bits are unset,
the entry is deemed inactive and removed. Common timeouts
for inactive connections for instance in Linux are at least
10 min [3].
C. SYN Authentication
SYN authentication requires no state information besides
the previously described connection state tracking. Therefore,
we choose a fixed-size bitmap as data-structure representing
the whitelist. For each entry, two bits are used to implement
the second-chance page replacement algorithm, resulting in a
total of approx. 1 GB of memory being used when representing
the complete IPv4 address space and whitelisting based on
individual source addresses. As the location of the bits for a
particular entry is known, no hash function to determine the
key has to be used. For IPv6, either whitelisting based on
subnets or a hash-based data-structure has to be used.
D. SYN Cookies
The SYN cookie approach requires additional state infor-
mation beside the connection state tracking. Increased mem-
ory consumption make the bitmap impractical. Instead this
approach uses concurrent hash maps, as the garbage collection
process has to run as separate process to not interfere and
block time-sensitive lookups. When operating a normal hash
map implementation, every insert operation would invalidate
the iterator object used to traverse the map. Furthermore, when
using only this mechanism to remove invalid entries, re-using
of ports is infeasible due to the long timeout.
To leverage the advantages of both approaches—immediate
removal of connections and garbage collection of left-over
entries—we use a hybrid approach coined swap-out hash
maps. Instead of a concurrent hash map and timeout bits,
two normal hash maps (active and history) are used in
conjunction. Rather than periodically unsetting bits, history
is deleted and replaced by the active map, and a new empty
active hash map is initialized.
The lookup procedure consists of two stages. First, the
active map is checked. If the entry exists, it is returned and
no further action is performed. If not, the same lookup is per-
formed in the history map. If no entry is found, the connec-
tion is assumed to not exist. Otherwise, the entry is copied to
the active map, employing the second chance mechanism,
and returned. Inactive entries are eventually swapped out to the
history map before being deleted with the next swap. Insert
operations are performed exclusively on the active hash
map. With this scheme, no hash map is traversed, removing
the need of a concurrent hash map.
Because of the primary assumption of the proxy, i.e., only
a margin of all traffic belongs to verified connections, merely
a small number of entries is expected to be maintained in
the hash maps. Based on this conclusion, we choose Google’s
sparse hash map implementation [4]. As each value object
consists of approximately 40 bit, no bottlenecks regarding
required memory space, when keeping thousands of inactive
entries up to ten minutes, are expected. The performance
impact of a swap-out, and consequent copy-up operations for
active connections is reduced by the long timeout interval.
We implemented two strategies to delay the initial TCP
data: storing the initial request, and using active notification
after completing the handshake with the server. Storing the
segment at the proxy requires the complete data to be copied
into a buffer, which is stored with the remaining meta data
for the connection. This significantly increases complexity
and amount of data stored per connection (up to 1500 B),
in particular, it requires proper garbage collection of leftover
stalled packet buffers to prevent memory leaks. Furthermore,
the added complexity quickly makes this approach become
infeasible if the client sends more than one data segment
before the second handshake is finished or segments are
received out of order. For both strategies our evaluation has
shown that latency can be reduced to 10 ms or lower, implying
that no retransmission after a timeout is required.
E. Optimizations
To reduce computational complexity, offloading features of
modern NICs are used for checksum calculation.
For every TCP segment received by the proxy, exactly one
action has to be performed, resulting in one outgoing packet,
e.g. sending a SYN/ACK as response to a SYN. Parallelizing
the processing by performing all possible actions for each
packet of a batch is infeasible as it generates a lot of unwanted,
potentially harmful traffic, which would even increase the
flooding attack. In all cases, the proxy either answers with a
specific pre-crafted (templated) segment, where only addresses
etc. have to be updated, or forwards the received segment
with slight changes. Reusing RX buffers is only beneficial for
the latter case, however, this concerns only a small amount
of the overall received traffic, assuming that the majority is
SYN flood traffic. Denoting which buffer can be reused and
which buffer should be replaced with a templated packet
(“dropout batching”) would require a bit-mask, which can
only be efficiently implemented in C, generating additional
overhead per batch [21]. Furthermore, RX buffers can not be
reused when being transmitted on a different port.
Instead, RX buffers are never re-used and we utilize on-
demand optimistic reduced allocation. For buffers to be for-
warded, the complete content is copied, for all other replies
we use templated TX buffers from DPDK mempools. For
packets that are less likely to be used (RST segments after
successful whitelisting) buffers are only allocated on-demand.
This reduces overhead when the buffers are not actually used.
V. PROGRAMMABLE DATA PLANE PROTOTYPE
P4 [11] is a standardized DSL for programming software
and hardware data planes. It enables rapid development cycles
and creates portable implementations of network applications
for ASIC, FPGA, and SmartNIC data planes. Its match-action
based paradigm makes it an excellent language to realize
packet filtering and DoS mitigation applications.
A difference to using a packet processing framework like
libmoon is that P4 does not allow raw packet handling.
Packets can only be modified through constructs allowed by
the language. Furthermore, P4 has a clear separation between
data and control plane: While the data plane is able to match
the entries of P4 tables to incoming packets and perform
respective actions, only the control plane can insert new entries
into a P4 table. The data plane can use digest messages to
communicate with the controller, which in our case runs on
the same node that also runs the P4 data plane (see Figures 6c
and 6d).
A. Realized Programs and Targets
We have implemented P4 programs for the SYN cookie and
SYN authentication strategies and tested their functionality
using the Mininet-based bmv2 [1] P4 switch target. For all
platforms the P4 program at is core remains the same. How-
ever, due to using different P4 architecture models and offering
different externs or extern interfaces, all platforms require
small modifications to the P4 program. To reduce overhead
we only ported the implementations requiring simpler state
maintenance, Authfull and Authcookie, to multiple P4 targets:
t4p4s [51] (formerly known as P4ELTE) is a DPDK-based P4
software target running on COTS hardware (see Figure 6c).
We choose it as it uses the same underlying framework as
our libmoon implementation and offers a comparison between
implementing raw packet processing to using a DSL for data
plane programming. Further, we have ported the implementa-
tion to a many-core and a FPGA based hardware data plane,
the Agilio Network Flow Processor (NFP)-4000 SmartNIC [5]
and the NetFPGA SUME [26], respectively (see Figure 6d).
B. Program Core
The P4 implementations for the mentioned strategies follow
the same structure independent of the used strategy. At first,
packets are parsed up to and including the TCP header. The
following match-action pipeline at its core functions as a L2
forwarder. Depending on the determined outgoing port, MAC
addresses are updated using a table lookup. As P4 cannot
generate new packets, the received packet is modified accord-
ing to the strategy used, set TCP flags, and the state kept by
the proxy. State—whitelist or sequence number difference—is
maintained as match-action table, requiring one lookup for
every segment. No changes to the IP layer are performed
besides swapping IP addresses, requiring only an update of
the TCP checksum before the packet is transmitted.
C. Cookie Calculation
To calculate a standard-conform cookie, the P4 target needs
to offer functionality for timestamping and hash calculation.
Integration of cryptographic hash functions in P4 data planes
is possible for software, NFP, and FPGA targets [46]. The
integration and use of SipHash as extern on the software target
is straight forward as it can be added as library to the hardware
dependent t4p4s code. Although the NFP target includes a
crypto accelerator for SHA1 and SHA2, it was unavailable on
our card, wherefore we opted to integrate a SipHash function
as extern. The NFP allows to add extern functions written in a
variant of C used to program the processing cores. We are not
aware of a P4 ASIC that supports cryptographic functions.
An alternative to raw timestamp access is by using a table
containing a counter representing a timestamp value, which is
updated by the control plane.
D. Whitelisting
The easiest approach to perform whitelisting in a P4 pro-
gram is to use a match-action table. The data plane informs
the control plane through a digest message whenever a flow or
IP address should be whitelisted and the control plane inserts
an according table entry.
An alternative approach that does not include a control plane
is to use a bloom-filter data structure built with registers.
However, the downsides are the increased complexity and
resource consumption of the P4 program, as well as challenges
in maintaining the state in the bloom-filter, in particular,
evicting outdated entries.
E. Buffering Packets
Stalling the initial data sent by TCP when using the
SYN cookie strategy is not possible when using P4, as P4
has no construct to write entire packets to memory. This
is only possible if the target provides an extern for this
task, however, it is unlikely due to the memory capacity and
memory bandwidth required to perform this operation at line-
rate in a programmable ASIC, FPGA, or SmartNIC.
An alternative is to use a secondary COTS device as
storage server (“slow-path”), programmed using for instance
a framework like libmoon. If a packet needs to be stalled,
the proxy forwards this segment to the storage server. Once
the handshake is finished, the proxy informs the controller,
and the controller instructs the storage server to transmit the
stalled packet. The downsides are the increased complexity for
the hardware setup, as well as necessary controller logic.
As the underlying problem can be circumvented by using a
TCP zero window or active notification, we did not implement
this slow-path solution.
VI. EVALUATION
Software packet processing frameworks allow high flexi-
bility through raw packet processing and easy addition of
complex data-structures, but require careful development and
optimization, and are limited to software platforms. Using a
standardized DSL like P4 makes program development simpler
and portable to ASIC, FPGA and SmartNIC devices, but
comes at the cost of flexibility as the set of functions offered is
limited. The following uses empirical measurements to com-
pare performance metrics of the discussed implementations.
A. Metrics
The primary performanc indicator for a SYN proxy is the
amount of SYN flood processed. From a user perspective, the
amount of HTTP requests served without packet loss and the
overall latency are a concern. While in general the latency of a
device or application when operating in an overload scenario
is not of interest, in the case of a SYN proxy it is highly
likely that the proxy will reach an overload state during a
high volume attack. We therefore analyze latency values in
low (no SYN flood), middle (50 % of total processed SYN
flood) and overload scenarios.
B. Measurement Setup
The load generating host sends malicious SYN flood and
legitimate HTTP traffic via two separate links to the Device-
under-Test (DuT). Using a 10 GbE switch, the traffic is mixed
so that malicious and legitimate traffic arrive at the DuT at
the same port (i.e. is indistinguishable based on the ingress
port). We use Moongen [19] as load generator for the SYN
flood traffic. A constant load of HTTP queries is generated
using wrk2 [49]. All measurements are run for 30 s, allowing
for accurate latency results up to the 99.999 %-ile.
Linux as DuT cannot be configured to run as SYN proxy,
therefore, the webserver is located on the same node (see
Figure 7a). For all other scenarios using a SYN proxy, the
DuT forwards traffic classified as legitimate to a separate host
hosting the webserver (see Figure 7b).
For measurements using Linux or t4p4s the DuT is a COTS
server system, equipped with an Intel X722 network card and
an Intel Xeon Gold 6130 CPU clocked at 2.1 GHz. In other
scenarios the DuT is a server equipped with either a 10 GbE
NFP-4000 Agilio SmartNIC [5] or a NetFPGA SUME [26].
For all measurements with the COTS system we disabled
turbo boost, set the CPU frequency to the maximum of
2.1 GHz, and pinned all traffic to one CPU core. When using
Linux as DuT the webserver is pinned to a different CPU
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Fig. 8: Maximum processed SYN flood traffic
core as we are not interested in measuring its performance
impact. In all scenarios, the nginx webserver is limited to one
worker/CPU and serves a 1 kB static website.
C. Webserver Overload
Preliminary tests show that the webserver is capable of
processing up to 30000 HTTP requests per second for 10 to
10000 parallel connections. However, latency increases when
using more than 1000 parallel connections or more than 4000
requests per second. For more than 700 parallel connections
we encountered reduced success probability even when issuing
only 100 HTTP requests per second. As we do not want to
measure overload artifacts of the webserver node, we restrict
our measurements to 100 parallel connections, issuing a total
of 100 and 1000 HTTP requests per second.
D. Processed SYN Flood
Figure 8 shows the maximum amount of SYN flood each
implementation is able to process. For all implementations the
use of a cryptographic hash function is the limiting factor and
reduces the maximum processed SYN flood by up to 50%.,
which is comparable to other studies [46]. Due to the possibil-
ity to optimize and parallelize packet processing, the libmoon
implementation achieves up to 50 % better performance than
the t4p4s implementation using P4. Only the hardware P4
targets are capable of processing up to 14 Mpps of SYN flood
traffic when using the simpler Authfull strategy.
For the software implementations, batch processing has
a significant influence on performance (Figure 9). The raw
packet handling of libmoon allows the complete processing of
packets to be performed in batches. In particular, cookie values
are calculated for the complete batch, reducing the overhead
of C calls from libmoon. For t4p4s the impact of batching
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is reduced, as each packet is processed by the P4 pipeline
individually, although packets are received in batches. For all
remaining measurements we have used the optimal batch sizes
of 64 and 32 for libmoon and t4p4s, respectively.
The COTS proxy implementations do not have to share state
between cores when using receive-side scaling to assign flows
to CPU cores. All implemented strategies scale linear with the
number of cores (Figure 10), such that even when cookies are
calculated, close to line-rate can be reached.
E. Quality of HTTP Requests
For all implemented solutions the success probability for
100 HTTP requests per second is at 100 % until the point
of overload (Figure 11). After this point, the probability
slowly drops. As the webserver is not overloaded, all requests
reaching the server are served, however, with increasing SYN
flood, causing processing overload for the proxy, the chance
that the proxy is able to process and forward legitimate traffic
drops. As the NFP is able to process the SYN flood at almost
line-rate, no packet loss for HTTP packets are encountered.
Using more requests per second reduces the success prob-
ability during overload. This is due to the same amount of
parallel connections being used. The number of connections
experiencing a timeout remain the same, however, in the case
of having more requests per second for a given connection, one
timeout has a larger impact. Increasing the number of parallel
connections reverts this effect as expected, as the impact of
one connection experiencing a timeout is reduced.
SYN cookies are not able to process the increased amount
of HTTP traffic even for low SYN flood. This is due to the
increased complexity of the state keeping, causing problems
for rapid port reuse as previous state still persists.
To reduce clutter, we do not show Authcookie. For these
strategies the slope is the same as for their respective Authfull
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counterparts, however, shifted to the left, which is correlated
to the reduced maximum SYN flood that can be processed. In
this case, the probability also drops for the NFP platform.
Connection latencies for the best case (no SYN flood), aver-
age case (50 % SYN flood in relation to maximum processed
flood) and worst case (overload at maximum processed flood)
are shown in Figure 12. For most scenarios, the median latency
is between 1 and 1.4 ms, while for the no flood and 50 % cases
a long-tail up to 4 ms is visible. The COTS implementations
show sporadic outliers and, when reaching overload, a long-tail
behavior with up to a second already for the 90th percentile.
Due to the mentioned lower probability when issuing 1000
HTTP requests per second for 100 parallel connections, the
median latency during overload is above one second.
The exception is the NFP, which shows latencies between 1
and 4 ms without outliers even under overload. Furthermore,
the latency of the no flood scenario is worse compared to when
increasing the SYN flood load. We attribute this to specifics
of the architecture, improving processing when increasing the
backpressure on internal buffers or when reducing idle cycles
caused by energy saving features.
For the Authfull implementation on the NetFPGA SUME
the latency for up to 1000 HTTP requests per second was
stable between 1 to 4 ms without outliers up to a SYN
flood of 1.5 Mpps. However, for higher loads of mixed traffic
the program stopped working, which we attribute to timing
issues of the generated program. Related work shows that the
NetFPGA SUME in general is able to run P4 programs of
higher complexity with latency below 10 µs and no long-tail.
This is even possible when modifying the P4 architecture of
the NetFPGA to integrate a SipHash or SHA3 core, which can
be used to hash even complete packet data. [46]
F. Resource Consumption
For the NetFPGA SUME the synthesized P4 proxy program
only uses up to one third of the total resources (Table III). This
leaves enough resources to further enhance the program to de-
fend against other attacks or to add a SipHash implementation
into the P4 pipeline, allowing to even perform Authcookie.
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LUTs Registers BRAM
Abs. % Abs. % Abs. [kB] %
Authfull 98,343 22.71 156,678 18.08 18.450 34.87
taken from [46]
Baseline 64,533 14.90 109,783 12.67 16,362 30.92
SipHash 66,380 15.32 114,282 13.19 17,460 32.99
SHA3-512 73,449 16.95 118,689 13.70 17,460 32.99
TABLE III: Resource utilization of proxy on NetFPGA SUME
compared to P4 hash implementations taken from [46]
VII. RELATED WORK
SYN Cookie Implementations Besides Linux, other ma-
jor operating systems like Windows and FreeBSD employ
TCP SYN cookies as preferred mitigation method, enabled
by default during periods with high traffic volumes [38, 9].
SYN cookies, as part of a SYN proxy, have been imple-
mented by multiple projects. A SYNPROXY module for the
netfilter framework is available in Linux [37]. Managing the
SYN flood, SYNPROXY forwards only legitimate traffic to the
Linux kernel. To do so, the initial SYN segment is intercepted
by netfilter, calculating a SYN cookie. Once the client finishes
connection establishment with a verified cookie, the proxy
sends a SYN segment to the original server destination, using
the initially negotiated options. After finishing the second
handshake, the proxy is only involved in sequence number and
timestamp translation [37]. This approach enabled mitigation
of a 2 Mpps SYN flood using only 7 % CPU utilization on a
eight core system [37].
Other proposed techniques and implementations produce
unsatisfying (<< 1 Mpps) performance [29], break TCP or
require specialized clients [31], or only mitigate attacks in
particular scenarios, thus interfering with deployment [32].
High-Performance Attack Mitigation in Software As
standard network stack implementations are not capable of
high-performance packet processing, dedicated frameworks
have been created over recent years [10, 15, 24, 45, 22].
With kernel bypass, memory pre-allocation, parallelization
and batch processing, among others, deficiencies of common
bottlenecks are negated, enabling packet processing beyond
10 Gbit/s on commodity hardware.
DDoStop [34] is an application based on the Snabb virtual
switch [25], a framework for fast packet networking. This
NFV-like app offers zombie detection, a term coined by Arbor
Networks, i.e., blocking of “source hosts that exceed certain
thresholds” [34]. Subject to the complexity of the rule-set and
required packet parsing, 1 Mpps to 10 Mpps of general DoS
traffic, per core, were mitigateable [34].
VIII. CONCLUSION
SYN flooding is the predominant traffic for high-volume
(D)DoS attacks on the Internet and will likely remain so in the
future as the root-cause cannot be fixed. SYN cookie and SYN
authentication can prevent memory exhaustion caused by SYN
floods at the price of increased computational complexity.
Our case study demonstrates that computational costs are
too high to effectively defend against SYN flood attacks on
the end host itself. However, the client puzzle—including a
cryptographic hash value—is currently the single effective
defense strategy, guaranteeing that no malicious connection
attempts are successful.
A more scalable solution is a SYN proxy running on a
dedicated node. This allows the protection of entire networks
without increased resource usage. Our prototype implemen-
tations based on libmoon, as well as the P4 language used
to program software and hardware data planes, show that
SYN cookie and SYN authentication, when used in a proxy
setup, scale to mitigate SYN flooding at 10 GbE line-rate.
The libmoon proxy scales well and allows almost arbitrary
complex packet processing, while the P4 solutions are easier
to implement and can be ported to different target platforms,
in particular hardware devices, which achieve lower latency
with less or no outliers.
We conclude that effective and efficient SYN flood mitita-
tion on modern data planes is possible. With both migitation
strategies performing equally, we recommend SYN authenti-
cation, being the simpler to implement. The crucial limiting
factor for hardware data plane solutions is the availability of a
suitable cryptographic hash function. However, cryptographic
hash operations can be implemented in hardware efficiently—
demonstrated by large-scale experimental prototypes such as
Bitcoin—which would allow for powerful data plane driven
SYN flood migitation.
AVAILABILITY
As part of our ongoing effort towards repeatable, replicable
and reproducible network research, we release the source code
of our SYN proxy implementations for libmoon and P4 targets
at https://github.com/syn-proxy/implementations.
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